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ISSUES ARISING UPON THE DEATH 
OF THE SOLE MEMBER OF A SINGLE-
MEMBER LLC 
F. PHILIP MANNS, JR. & TIMOTHY M. TODD* 
Sole entrepreneurs overwhelmingly choose the single-member limited 
liability company (SMLLC) as the business entity for their operations.  
Consequently, simplicity of formation and operation of SMLLCs is highly 
desirable, both to facilitate entrepreneurship and to acknowledge that costs, 
lack of knowledge, bad advice, or a combination of them very often will 
cause sole entrepreneurs to forego professionally drafted documents and 
accept default SMLLC rules in the jurisdiction of formation. 
The death of the sole member is always an anticipated, indeed 
inevitable, occurrence, so one would expect that the default statutory rules 
and the widely available forms for SMLLCs would address this eventuality 
adequately.  Unfortunately, that is not the case.  In this Article, we address 
how SMLLC organizational documents should always address the death 
of the sole member of an SMLLC, and we conclude that a provision for 
the nonprobate transfer on death of the sole member’s interest should be 
included.  We also address the federal tax consequences of death-time 
transfers of SMLLC interests, and we uncover a thorny conflict between 
federal income taxes, which disregard the entity, and federal transfer taxes, 
which regard the entity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that Founder operates a substantial business enterprise 
through a limited liability company of which Founder is the sole member.  
Such single-member limited liability companies (SMLLCs) are a very 
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common form of business organization.  The SMLLC has largely replaced 
the sole proprietorship,1 principally because the sole member of an 
SMLLC bears no liability for entity debts whereas a sole proprietor bears 
full liability for any debts of the sole proprietorship.  This protection from 
liability exists because, for purposes of creditor claims, the LLC is an 
entity separate from its owners, and a sole proprietorship is not.  Yet, 
because LLCs are entities, they operate according to state statutes 
providing a complete set of default rules for governing the LLC.2  Those 
LLC statutes also grant broad authority to vary the default rules within 
organizational documents.3  This is an important point because, although 
any entity can suffer from inadequately drafted organizational 
documents, the problem is more common and more acute with SMLLCs: 
inadequate business knowledge, bad advice, concerns about costs, or a 
combination of them may cause an entrepreneur to forego professionally 
drafted documents and accept the default SMLLC rules in the jurisdiction 
of formation. 
Suppose Founder dies and the organizational documents governing 
his SMLLC have made no provisions addressing his death.  As a result, 
the default rules for member death will govern.  Because LLCs are 
governed by the statutes of the state under which the SMLLC was 
created, fifty-one variations of default rules exist in the United States.  
However, the states have largely patterned their LLC statutes on four 
models.  Those four models handle the death of the sole member of an 
SMLLC in different ways.4 
II. DEATH OF THE SOLE MEMBER OF AN SMLLC UNDER THE FOUR 
MODEL STATUTES 
When considering the consequences of the death of the sole member 
of an SMLLC, two distinct steps of analysis arise—one related to the 
owner, the other related to the entity.  First, does the death cause the 
decedent to lose his or her membership status (a process often referred 
 
1.  See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of 
the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–
2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
459 (2010). 
2.  E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-1.01 to -12.05 (Supp. 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
1000 to -1080 (2011 & Supp. 2015). 
3.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-1.08; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1011(B) (2011).  
4.  See infra Part II. 
 728 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:725 
to as dissociation)?  Second, does the entity dissolve upon the member’s 
dissociation (a process often referred to as dissolution)? 
Four models of LLC statutes exist: the Prototype Limited Liability 
Company Act (ABA Prototype Act)5 (1992); the Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (ULLCA)6 (1996); the Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company (RULLCA)7 (2006); and the Revised Prototype 
Limited Liability Company Act (ABA Revised Prototype Act)8 (2011). 
A. ABA Prototype Act (1992) 
Under the default rules of the ABA Prototype Act, when the sole 
member of an SMLLC dies, both dissociation and dissolution occur.  A 
member’s death is an event of dissociation under section 802(A)(6).9  
While that subsection does permit the operating agreement to provide 
otherwise,10 under our hypothetical, the operating agreement did not 
address the member’s death. 
Under section 901, an event of dissociation of any member causes 
dissolution of the LLC “unless (1) the business of the limited liability 
company is continued by the consent of all the remaining members on or 
before the 90th day following the occurrence of any such event or (2) 
otherwise provided in writing in an operating agreement.”11  Under our 
 
5.  PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992), reprinted 
in 3 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES app. C (2d ed. 2015). 
6.  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996), 6B U.L.A. 653 (2008 & Supp. 
2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ullca96.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5M8-58BE].  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) “drafted the original Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in 
1992 and adopted it in 1994.”  Matthew D. Maser & Joseph R. Hefflinger, Nebraska’s New 
Limited Liability Company Act: A Welcome Improvement for Legal Guidance Concerning 
Limited Liability Companies, 89 NEB. L. REV. 470, 471 (2011).  NCCUSL thereafter amended 
the ULLCA in 1996 following promulgation of the “check-the-box” federal tax regulations.  Id.   
7.  REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2011), 6B 
U.L.A. 407 (2008 & Supp. 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability
%20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/95WV-NBKL].  The RULLCA was 
adopted by NCCUSL in 2006 and amended in 2011 and 2013.  UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY ACT (2006) prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2013), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ULLCA_Final_20
14_2015aug19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B7S-VAAW]. 
8.  REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011), 
reprinted in 67 BUS. LAW. 117 (2011). 
9.  PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 802(A)(6)(I). 
10.  Id. § 802(A)(6). 
11.  Id. § 901(C) (emphasis added). 
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hypothetical, the operating agreement does not alter the default 
dissolution rule. 
Consequently, if an SMLLC is formed under the 1992 ABA Prototype 
Act and lacks an operating agreement addressing dissociation or 
dissolution, dissolution is automatic when the sole member dies because 
it is impossible for “all the remaining members”—who do not exist—to 
consent to continuance.12 
B. ULLCA (1996) 
The default rules of the ULLCA create an entity adrift when the sole 
member of an SMLLC dies.  Under section 601, a member’s death is an 
event of dissociation,13 but under section 801, a member’s dissociation 
does not dissolve the LLC unless the operating agreement says it does.14  
According to the comments to the ULLCA, that act did not treat a 
member’s dissociation as a dissolution because of “[n]ew and important 
Internal Revenue Service announcements [that] clarify that the failure of 
member dissociation to cause or threaten dissolution of a limited liability 
company will not cause the company to be taxed like a corporation.”15  
However, the ULLCA’s default anti-dissolution rule seemingly permits 
an LLC without a member and without a nonjudicial mechanism to 
dissolve the entity. 
Under section 503, a transferee becomes a member only if all other 
members consent or the operating agreement provides otherwise.16  
Without any members, such consent is impossible to achieve.  Therefore, 
the now undissolved and member-less entity lacks a person to act for it. 
The only mechanism to escape the entity-adrift problem under the 
ULLCA is for the transferee of the sole member’s interest to seek, under 
section 801(a)(5), “a judicial determination that it is equitable to wind up 
the company’s business.”17  Although section 803(b) provides that “[a] 
 
12.  Id. 
13.  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 601(a)(8)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996), 6B U.L.A. 653, 
607–08. 
14.  Id. § 801, 6B U.L.A. at 619.  “Unless member dissociation is specified as an event of 
dissolution in the operating agreement, such dissociation does not dissolve the company.”  Id. 
§ 801 cmt., 6B U.L.A. at 620. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. § 503(a), 6B U.L.A. at 603 (“A transferee of a distributional interest may become 
a member of a limited liability company if and to the extent that the transferor gives the 
transferee the right in accordance with authority described in the operating agreement or all 
other members consent.”). 
17.  Id. § 801(a)(5), 6B U.L.A. at 619. 
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legal representative of the last surviving member may wind up a limited 
liability company’s business,”18 an SMLLC is not in dissolution when the 
sole member dies.19  Therefore, although section 803 would have provided 
authority had section 801 caused a dissolution, section 801 does not cause 
a dissolution when the sole member of an SMLLC dies.  Consequently, 
the dissolution of an SMLLC upon the death of the sole member can 
occur only by a judicial determination sought by the transferee of the sole 
member’s interest. 
Curiously, if the “legal representative of the last surviving member” 
does “wind up a limited liability company’s business,”20 the legal 
representative must meet the “General Standards of Member’s and 
Manager’s Conduct.”21  However, that legal representative apparently 
cannot exercise a member’s authority to waive the winding up and 
continue the LLC’s business.22  
Consequently, the default operation of the ULLCA produces a 
difficult-to-solve problem—a continuing entity without a member—that 
seemingly can be solved only by a judicial order of dissolution.  Thus, the 
default operation of the ULLCA is suboptimal in two respects: Litigation 
is always necessary, and continuance is impossible. 
C. RULLCA (2006) 
The RULLCA cures the entity-adrift problem of the ULLCA by 
creating a mechanism for creating a new member.  Under section 602, a 
member’s death is an event of dissociation.23  However, under section 701, 
 
18.  Id. § 803(b), 6B U.L.A. at 624. 
19.  Id. § 801 cmt., 6B U.L.A. at 620 (“Unless member dissociation is specified as an event 
of dissolution in the operating agreement, such dissociation does not dissolve the company.”). 
20.  Id. § 803(b), 6B U.L.A. at 624.  Section 803(b) is a particular application of the general 
rule of section 801(a)(5) that the transferee of any member’s interest may seek “a judicial 
determination that it is equitable to wind up the company’s business.”  Id. § 801(a)(5), 6B 
U.L.A. at 19.  Note that if the winding up of a multi-member LLC (MMLLC) is occurring by 
other members, a “member’s legal representative” may seek “judicial supervision of the 
winding up.”  Id. § 803(a), 6B U.L.A. at 624. 
21.  Id. § 409(g), 6B U.L.A. at 598. 
22.  Id. § 802(b), 6B U.L.A. at 623 (“At any time after the dissolution of a limited liability 
company and before the winding up of its business is completed, the members, including a 
dissociated member whose dissociation caused the dissolution, may unanimously waive the 
right to have the company’s business wound up and the company terminated.” (emphasis 
added)). 
23.  REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 602(a)(6)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 
2011), 6B U.L.A. 407, 503 (2008) (“A person is dissociated as a member when . . . (6) in the 
case of an individual: (A) the individual dies . . . .”). 
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“[a] limited liability company is dissolved, and its activities must be 
wound up, upon the occurrence of any of the following: . . . (3) the 
passage of 90 consecutive days during which the company has no 
members . . . .”24 
But, under section 401(d),  
[a]fter formation of a limited liability company, a person becomes 
a member: . . . (3) with the consent of all the members; or (4) if, 
within 90 consecutive days after the company ceases to have any 
members: (A) the last person to have been a member, or the legal 
representative of that person, designates a person to become a 
member; and (B) the designated person consents to become a 
member.25   
Thus, the default operation of the RULLCA creates a dissolution when 
the LLC has no members for 90 days but also creates a mechanism for the 
“legal representative of the last person to have been a member” to 
designate “a person” to become a member within that 90-day period.26  If 
that designation and consent by the designated person occur within 90 
days of the death of the sole member of the SMLLC, then the LLC 
continues because a dissolution after 90 days without a member 
necessarily will not occur.27  Thus, the RULLCA provides both maximum 
flexibility and interpretive difficulty because there is disagreement over 
who can act as the “legal representative” of the last member.  The 
discussion of the Whitfield28 case below amplifies upon the latter point.29 
D. ABA Revised Prototype Act (2011) 
The ABA Revised Prototype Act operates much like the RULLCA.  
Under the ABA Revised Prototype Act, death is an event of dissociation.  
Under section 602, “a person is dissociated as a member from a limited 
liability company when: . . . (f) in the case of a person who is an individual, 
 
24.  Id. § 701(a)(3), 6B U.L.A. at 506. 
25.  Id. § 401(d)(3)–(4), 6B U.L.A. at 478 (emphasis added).  In addition, the comment to 
section 104 states as follows: “The dissociation of an LLC’s last remaining member does 
threaten dissolution. Section 701(a)(3) (stating, as a default rule, that a limited liability 
company dissolves ‘upon . . . the passage of 90 consecutive days during which the limited 
liability company has no members’).”  Id. § 104 cmt. c, 6B U.L.A. at 438.  
26.  Id. §§ 701(a)(3), 702(c)–(d), 6B U.L.A. at 506–08. 
27.  Id. § 702(e), 6B U.L.A. at 508. 
28.  150 So. 3d 171 (Ala. 2014). 
29.  See infra Part III. 
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the person dies . . . .”30  That dissociation will cause a dissolution under 
section 706 by which “[a] limited liability company is dissolved, and its 
activities must be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of the 
following: . . . (d) the passage of 90 consecutive days after the occurrence 
of the dissociation of the last remaining member . . . .”31  However, 
continuation is possible under section 401, which provides:  
After formation of a limited liability company, a person is 
admitted as a member of the limited liability company . . . if, 
within 90 consecutive days after the occurrence of the dissociation 
of the last remaining member: (A) all holders of the limited 
liability company interest last assigned by the last person to have 
been a member consent to the designation of a person to be 
admitted as a member; and (B) the designated person consents to 
be admitted as a member effective as of the date the last person to 
have been a member ceased to be a member.32  
In addition, section 712 permits reinstatement after dissolution but 
requires action by members.33 
Thus, the RULLCA and ABA Revised Prototype Act both provide a 
mechanism to continue an SMLLC after the death of the sole member by 
action within 90 days of the death.34  The RULLCA requires action by 
the “legal representative of the last . . . member,”35 while the ABA 
Revised Prototype Act requires consent of “all holders of the limited 
liability company interest last assigned by the last person to have been a 
member.”36  Thus, under the ABA Revised Prototype Act two potential 
 
30.  REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 602(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2011). 
31.  Id. § 706(d). 
32.  Id. § 401(b)(4). 
33.  Id. § 712.  Section 712 provides one default mechanism for reinstatement after 
dissolution as follows:  
A limited liability company that has been dissolved may be reinstated upon 
compliance with the following conditions: (1) the affirmative vote or consent shall 
have been obtained from the members or other persons entitled to vote or consent at 
the time that is . . . sufficient for dissolution under this Act. 
Id. § 712(a)(1)(ii).  Section 712 provides other methods for reinstatement after dissolution, but 
those depend upon provisions having been included in the LLC’s operating agreement.  Id. 
§ 712(a)(1)(i). 
34.  Id. § 401(b)(4); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 403(d)(3)–(4) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N amended 2011), 6B U.L.A. 407, 478 (2008).  
35.  REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 702(c), 6B U.L.A. at 507. 
36.  REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 401(b)(4)(A). 
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problems arise in causing a continuation: (1) determining the holders of 
the deceased member’s interest and (2) meeting the requirement of 
unanimity.  The Whitfield case discussed below highlights problems in 
satisfying those requirements.  
III. A CASE STUDY: L.B. WHITFIELD, III FAMILY LLC V. WHITFIELD 
L.B. Whitfield, III Family LLC v. Whitfield is the only reported 
appellate decision to consider the continuation of an SMLLC upon the 
death of the sole member.37  The Alabama LLC statutes provided that a 
person ceased to be a member upon death,38 thereby creating a 
dissociation.  In addition, the death of the last member caused a 
dissolution unless 
a. [t]he holders of all the financial rights[39] in the limited 
liability company agree in writing, within 90 days after the 
cessation of membership of the last member, to continue the legal 
existence and business of the limited liability company and to 
appoint one or more new members [or]  
b. [t]he legal existence and business of the limited liability 
company is continued and one or more new members are 
appointed in the manner stated in the governing documents.40 
In Whitfield, the governing documents did not address the matter, so the 
statutory default rules squarely applied.41  
After an extended review of the facts, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
concluded that the holders of all the financial rights had not agreed in 
writing to continue the LLC.42  Apparently, the only document addressing 
the devolution of the sole member’s interest in the SMLLC was his will, 
which “made specific bequests of certain property and provided that the 
residue . . . was to be divided in four equal shares.”43  The court found that 
(1) the “all” of the LLC continuation statute meant all four of the sole 
 
37.  150 So. 3d 171 (Ala. 2014).  
38.  Id. at 184 (quoting ALA. CODE § 10A-5-6.06 (2010)). 
39.  In this regard, the Alabama statute is most like the ABA Revised Prototype Act, 
permitting dissolution negation by “holders of all the financial rights.”  Cf. REVISED 
PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 401(b)(4). 
40.  Whitfield, 150 So. 3d at 184 (quoting ALA. CODE § 10A-5-7.01). 
41.  See id. at 186 (“The Family LLC presents no argument as to subparagraph b. but does 
contend that the exception described in subparagraph a. is applicable.”). 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. at 176. 
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member’s residual devisees so that (2) the consent of the personal 
representative of the sole member’s estate was insufficient to trigger the 
Alabama continuation statute.44  
The court also rejected the personal representative’s argument that 
he had the power to continue the LLC under the following statute:  
(1) If a member who is an individual dies or if a court of 
competent jurisdiction adjudges a member to be incompetent to 
manage the member’s person or property, the member’s personal 
representative, conservator, legal representative, heirs, or legatees 
may exercise all the member’s financial rights for the purpose of 
settling the member’s estate or administering the member’s 
property, including any power the member had to transfer the 
membership interest.45 
The court (1) stated that the statutory language does not make the 
personal representative a member of the LLC but states only that the 
personal representative may exercise the financial rights;46 (2) stated that 
the power to transfer under the statutory language includes the power to 
transfer only the financial rights;47 (3) quoted legislative commentary as 
follows: “The personal representative may exercise only the member’s 
financial rights and does not have a right to participate in management 
[of the limited liability company]”;48 and (4) stated that the personal 
representative’s rights under that statutory language did not include the 
power to negate dissolution because the more specific Alabama LLC-
continuation statute applied instead.49 
The specific Alabama LLC-continuation statute provided that “[t]he 
holders of all the financial rights in the limited liability company [may] 
agree in writing, within 90 days after the cessation of membership of the 
last member, to continue the legal existence and business of the limited 
liability company and to appoint one or more new members.”50  This 
 
44.  Id. at 186 & n.10. 
45.  Id. at 184–85 (quoting ALA. CODE § 10A-5-6.04(a)(1)).  Statutes of this type often are 
called twilight statutes because they provide rights to personal representatives during 
administration of the decedent’s estate but not thereafter.   
46.  Id. at 185. 
47.  Id.  
48.  Id. (quoting commentary to ALA. CODE § 10-12-34(a)(1), which had been re-codified 
identically in ALA. CODE § 10A-5-6.04(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010)). 
49.  Id. (“[T]he Family LLC misunderstands the relative roles of the provisions of § 10A-
5-6.04 [twilight powers] and those of § 10A-5-7.01(3) [continuation powers].”). 
50.  ALA. CODE § 10A-5-7.01(3)(a) (2010).  The legislative comments to that section state 
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provision resembles section 401(b)(4) of the ABA Revised Prototype 
Act.51  Under both, a dissolution for lack of members can be negated by 
the creation of a new member within 90 days after the LLC ceased to have 
members.52  Under the ABA Revised Prototype Act, the continuation 
power belongs to “all holders of the limited liability company interest last 
assigned by the last person to have been a member” who must “consent 
to the designation of a person to be admitted as a member.”53  Under the 
Alabama statute, the continuation power belongs to “[t]he holders of all 
the financial rights in the limited liability company” who must “agree in 
writing.”54 
In Whitfield, no problem existed in identifying holders of the deceased 
member’s LLC interest and no real controversy existed about whether 
the four residual beneficiaries under the will had agreed in writing to a 
continuation; they clearly had not.55  However, difficulties can easily arise 
in identifying the holders of the deceased member’s SMLLC interest who 
jointly possess the continuation power under either the Alabama statute 
or the ABA Revised Prototype Act.  Suppose that the former sole 
member died intestate and the identity of all intestate successors cannot 
be made within 90 days.  Suppose further that the residual beneficiary of 
the former member’s will is the trustee of a trust.  Whitfield seemingly 
 
that the section was based on ABA Prototype Act section 901 and ULLCA section 801.  ALA. 
CODE § 10A-5-7.01 (LexisNexis 2010).  Section 901 of the ABA Prototype Act, as noted above, 
causes a dissolution on death of a member and permits continuation only by the consent of all 
of the remaining members within 90 days.  PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT 
§ 901 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992).  No provision was made for holders of financial interests to effect 
the continuation.  Section 801 of the ULLCA does not cause a dissolution upon death (or any 
other dissociation of a member) and has no continuation provision (other than for dissolutions 
due to “event[s] that make[] it unlawful for all or substantially all of the business of the company 
to be continued”).  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996), 6B U.L.A. 
653, 619.  Consequently, notwithstanding the comments in the Alabama statute—about being 
based on the ABA Prototype Act and ULLCA—the Alabama continuation provision most 
closely resembles section 401(b)(4) of the ABA Revised Prototype Act. 
51.  See REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 401(b)(4) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2011). 
52.  Compare ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-7.01 (2010), with REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 401(b)(4). 
53.  REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 401(b)(4)(A). 
54.  ALA. CODE § 10A-5-7.01(1)(a). 
55.  L.B. Whitfield, III Family LLC v. Whitfield, 150 So. 3d 171, 186 (Ala. 2014) (“Such 
principles require a rejection of the notion embedded throughout the Family LLC’s attempt to 
interpret those provisions differently—that somehow the sisters could agree to the continuation 
of the Family LLC and/or become members of it by implication or by [the personal 
representative’s] actions rather than their own actions and consent.”). 
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requires the consent of all of the beneficiaries of that trust.56  Contingent 
beneficiaries exist in nearly all testamentary trusts.57  Does this mean that 
the Alabama statute and the ABA Revised Prototype Act can never 
permit an agreed continuation in such situations? 
In Whitfield, the personal representative argued that he had the power 
to continue the LLC, but the court easily decided he did not have that 
power under the Alabama LLC-continuation statute; instead, it rested in 
the holders of the financial rights.58  However, under a RULLCA-based 
statute, the personal representative likely would have had the 
continuation power.59  Under the RULLCA, the person with the power 
to designate a new member is “the last person to have been a member, or 
the legal representative of that person.”60 
The RULLCA leaves the operative term “legal representative” 
undefined.  To identify the “legal representative,” presumably we 
determine the person to whom the former member’s rights in the LLC 
transferred.  That, in turn, depends on the manner in which the former 
member owned his interest.  If he owned it in his own name alone (as 
apparently did Mr. Whitfield), the rights in the LLC pass to the former 
member’s probate estate, in which case the “legal representative” would 
be the personal representative named in a will if the former member died 
with a valid will, or would be the administrator if the former member died 
without a valid will or with a valid will under which a personal 
representative was not effectively appointed.  Of course, determining the 
identity of the personal representative(s) or administrator(s) within 90 
days of the former member’s death can be problematic, especially if the 
will, the appointment of the personal representative, or the appointment 
of the administrator is contested.  Further, even if the personal 
 
56.  See id.  
57.  If the testator wanted to make outright gifts at her death, she would name the devisees 
outright in her will.  She will create a testamentary trust only if she wants to create less-than-
outright gifts in her will.  For any less-than-outright gift, a future interest near invariably arises 
in the person who will take after the termination of the interest of the donee of the less-than-
outright gift.  The gaining of possession under future interests typically is contingent on 
surviving until the time of possession, so future interests typically are contingent.  This makes 
the identity of all of the beneficiaries difficult because some may not yet be born, or may be 
minors whose consent to continuation of an LLC is problematic.  See generally F. Philip Manns, 
Jr., New Reasons to Remember the Estate Taxation of Reversions, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. 
L.J. 323 (2009). 
58.  Whitfield, 150 So. 3d at 184–85. 
59.  See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 702(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 
2011), 6B U.L.A. 407, 507 (2008). 
60.  Id. § 401(d)(4), 6B U.L.A. at 478. 
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representative or administrator can be quickly identified and appointed, 
how is that person to make the continuation decision?  How will the 
fiduciary duties of the personal representative or administrator apply to 
making the continuation decision?61 
Thus, of the four model statutes, the RULLCA’s default rule handles 
the matter the best: By placing the continuation power in one person, the 
RULLCA obviates the need for unanimous agreement of beneficiaries, 
some of whom may not be ascertainable within the 90-day period of the 
ABA Revised Prototype Act.62  Yet even this, which is the best solution 
under the four prevailing models, is suboptimal.  Consequently, it is our 
view that relying on the default provisions for SMLLC succession is 
perilous and ill-advised.  Therefore, we would expect that well-drafted 
governing documents would handle the matter.  Surprisingly, the 
published forms of suggested governing documents either do not address 
the matter or address it in a suboptimal way. 
IV. SUMMARY OF DEFAULT PROVISIONS ON SINGLE MEMBER’S 
DEATH 
Model 
Statute 
Dissociation Dissolution Continuation 
Possible? 
ABA Prototype 
Act (1992) Yes Yes No 
ULLCA (1996) Yes 
No, but entity 
adrift; needs 
judicial 
dissolution 
No 
RULLCA 
(2006) Yes Yes 
If legal 
representative 
acts in 90 days 
ABA Revised 
Prototype Act 
(2011) 
Yes Yes 
If all holders of 
the interest agree 
in 90 days 
 
61.  Consider that the personal representative or administrator will be under a fiduciary 
duty of care requiring him or her to acquire and assess a substantial amount of information 
about the business enterprise and then to decide whether to continue or dissolve it, all 
completed within 90 days.  That fiduciary—who often is a family member—may lack the 
necessary skills to make the decision.  As well, because of the family situation, the fiduciary’s 
duty to avoid a conflict of interest may make the situation even more fraught with peril. 
62.  See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 702(d), 6B U.L.A. at 508. 
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V. WIDELY AVAILABLE FORMS DO NOT ADDRESS DEATH 
Despite the substantial problems that arise upon the death of the 
single member, there is a dearth of discussion on the issue in academic 
and practitioner literature.  Although some authorities recognize the 
issue,63 the solutions posed are often suboptimal or create more 
paperwork than the transfer-on-death solution proposed by this Article.  
Cunningham and Proctor, for example, in their seminal LLC treatise, 
recognize the myriad of problems that arise when an individual serves as 
the single member.64  They note that, at death, the LLC will have no 
member, perhaps causing the LLC to cease to exist as an entity; the 
business assets will pass under probate; and the probate process may 
freeze management over the business.65  
To avoid those issues,66 some commentators propose a revocable trust 
structure in which the individual owns the SMLLC membership interest 
as the trustee of a revocable grantor trust.67  In this scenario, at the death 
of the individual, the successor-trustee now controls both the membership 
interest and the entity.  This solution undoubtedly works and, in some 
situations, may be optimal—particularly when other estate planning 
reasons make a trust advisable.  But, for many clients—particularly those 
with the fledgling startup—a revocable living trust setup only compounds 
complexity.68  That is, a whole new instrument must be drafted, explained 
to the client, and complied with.69  On the other hand, by using a transfer-
on-death provision—as this Article advances—the only additional 
drafting is the needed provisions in the operating agreement.70  Thus, we 
 
63.  See, e.g., JOHN M. CUNNINGHAM & VERNON R. PROCTOR, DRAFTING LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING AGREEMENTS § 15A.04 (3d ed. 2014-2 Supp.) (“Probate 
jurisdiction over the membership may effectively freeze the management and disposition of the 
LLC until the probate court approves the transfer of the membership.”). 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Commentators also note that, for continuity of management purposes, a manager-
managed SMLLC with a non-member assistant manager can help alleviate these issues as well.  
See, e.g., id. § 15A.07.  While true, in part, the issues may not be totally avoided, particularly in 
states that have forced dissolution upon the death of the single member. 
67.  E.g., id. § 15A.04.  Many LLC treatises and resources, however, ignore the issue 
entirely.  But see id. § 25C.08 (2015-2 Supp.) (noting that TOD statutes, in some states, may 
apply to LLC interests). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  See infra Part VI.C.1. 
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propose that, in a default or template SMLLC operating agreement, a 
transfer-on-death provision should be the norm. 
VI. ADDRESSING DEATH IN SMLLC DOCUMENTS 
A. Effectiveness of Transfer-on-Death Provisions in General 
Well into the mid-1900s, courts decided that contracts, deeds, and 
other instruments could not make transfers effective only at death unless 
such instruments met the formalities requirements for a valid will, which, 
of course, they did not.71  Since then, the nonprobate “revolution” has 
occurred, and provisions for transfers on death are permitted in a wide 
variety of instruments in all jurisdictions.72  Section 6-101 of the Uniform 
Probate Code has been a model for many nonprobate “revolution” 
statutes.73 
Under section 6-101 of the Uniform Probate Code, “[a] provision for 
a nonprobate transfer on death” in any of seventeen types of named 
instruments plus “other written instrument[s] of a similar nature is 
nontestamentary.”74  Oddly, a plain “contract” is not one of the seventeen 
named types, nor is an “operating agreement.” 
However, included within the seventeen types are “certificated or 
uncertificated security, account agreement, custodial agreement, deposit 
agreement, compensation plan,” and “conveyance.”75  An LLC operating 
agreement might be regarded as an “account agreement” because LLCs 
nearly always operate with an LLC owner having an “account” measuring 
 
71.  See In re Estate of Atkinson, 175 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1961) (“[A]n 
examination of the cases leads inevitably to the conclusion that . . . the registration of the 
certificates of deposit in this case is an ineffectual attempt at a testamentary disposition of the 
deposits involved.”). 
72.  JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 489 (9th 
ed. 2013) (“In 1969, the Uniform Probate Code authorized POD designations in all contracts, 
and almost every state has followed suit.” (citing JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE 
GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING tbl.5.01, Part 2 (2012))). 
73.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2010), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 
1, 354 (2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/2014_UPC_Final_20
15dec31.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7N4-B9C4].  
74.  Id. (“A provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in [1] an insurance policy, [2] 
contract of employment, [3] bond, [4] mortgage, [5] promissory note, [6] certificated or 
uncertificated security, [7] account agreement, [8] custodial agreement, [9] deposit agreement, 
[10] compensation plan, [11] pension plan, [12] individual retirement plan, [13] employee 
benefit plan, [14] trust, [15] conveyance, [16] deed of gift, [17] marital property agreement, or 
other written instrument of a similar nature is nontestamentary.”). 
75.  Id. 
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her financial interest in the LLC.76  Or, an LLC operating agreement 
might be regarded as a “deposit agreement,” a “compensation plan,” or 
a “conveyance” because such LLC operating agreements typically 
involve the conveyance of property by the owner to the entity, involve 
the entity’s compensating of its owners, or involve the deposit of property 
into the entity. 
Yet the point remains that an LLC operating agreement does not 
squarely fall within any of the seventeen named categories in Uniform 
Probate Code section 6-101.  However, only a trivial semantic objection 
supports the conclusion that an LLC operating agreement neither meets 
nor closely resembles several of the named categories,77 so LLC operating 
agreements either actually meet the categories or constitute “other 
written instrument[s] of a similar nature.”78  As such, LLC operating 
agreements likely fall within statutes that generally allow transfer-on-
death provisions. 
Nevertheless, to avoid that semantic objection, a drafter may prefer 
to rely upon one of the enumerated interests and not the catchall 
language of “other written instrument of a similar nature.”  The best fit 
of those listed would be “certificated or uncertificated security.” 
1. Is an SMLLC Interest a Security Under Uniform Probate Code 
Section 6-101? 
The Uniform Probate Code defines a security as, among other things, 
“any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness . . . [or] any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
security.”79  It would then be reasonable to turn to the 1933 Securities 
Act80 to inform the catchall “instrument commonly known as a 
security.”81  Under the 1933 Securities Act, the only way an LLC could be 
a security would be as an “investment contract.”82 
 
76.  See id. § 6-101, 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 354. 
77.  See id. 
78.  See id. 
79.  Id. § 1-201(43), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 1, 49 (2013).  
80.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2012)).  
81.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(43), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. at 49. 
82.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining the term “security” to include, inter alia, an 
“investment contract”). 
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Under the infamous Howey test,83 an investment contract has four 
elements: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) 
with an expectation of profit, and (4) based solely on the efforts of 
others.84  The issue with LLC interests generally is element four—profit 
seeking based on the efforts of others, i.e., control.85  
In an SMLLC, however, element two—common enterprise—is also 
problematic because there is no pooling of interests between investors.86  
Consequently, for our purposes, an SMLLC is not an investment contract 
regardless of how it is managed, so it is likely not a security under the 
Uniform Probate Code section 6-101 or the 1933 Securities Act. 
2. Is an SMLLC Interest a Security Under Other Uniform Acts? 
Another way to argue that an SMLLC is a “security” under section 6-
101 of the Uniform Probate Code is to use Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) section 8-102(15), which, as relevant here, defines a security as 
“an interest in an issuer” that (1) is registered on the books maintained 
by the issuer, (2) is by its terms divisible into interests, and (3) is a medium 
for investment and it expressly provides to be governed by Article 8.87  By 
fitting within this definition, it can be argued that the LLC interest 
satisfies the Uniform Probate Code definition of “commonly known as a 
security.”88  The downside to this approach, of course, is the imposition of 
UCC Article 8 obligations upon the issuer—here, the SMLLC. 
 
83.  See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).  
84.  Id. at 298–99.  
85.  See, e.g., CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 11.03 (2016); CUNNINGHAM & PROCTOR, supra note 
63, § 25B.02, at 25B-8 (2015-2 Supp.) (“Much litigation about whether an LLC membership 
interest is a security focuses on the control element of the Howey test.”). 
86.  This pooling requirement normally requires either horizontal or vertical 
commonality.  “[H]orizontal commonality requires a pooling of investors’ contributions and 
distribution of profits and losses on a pro-rata basis among investors.”  Maura K. Monaghan, 
An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise Element of Investment Contract 
Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152–53 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also 
CUNNINGHAM & PROCTOR, supra note 63, § 25B.02, at 25B-9 to -11, (2015-2 Supp.).  As 
commentators have noted, “[a]s long as an LLC has two members, it has horizontal 
commonality.”  BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 85, ¶ 11.03[1][a].  Vertical commonality 
requires a showing “that the fortunes of the investors are linked with those of the promoters.”  
SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nev., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985).  
87.  U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).  
88.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(43) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 
U.L.A. 1, 49 (2010).  
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Another uniform statute to consider is the Uniform TOD Security 
Registration Act (TOD Act).89  It allows a security registered in 
beneficiary form to pass to that beneficiary at the owner’s death.90  Here, 
a “security” is defined as “a share, participation, or other interest in 
property, in a business, or in an obligation of an enterprise or other issuer, 
and includes a certificated security, an uncertificated security, and a 
security account.”91  Although this definition is based on UCC section 8-
102,92 it is broader, as not all “interest[s] . . . in a business”93 would be a 
security under other statutory schemes.94  An SMLLC interest is likely 
covered because it is an interest in a business. 
The additional key terms to consider are the TOD Act’s use of the 
words “register” and “beneficiary form.”  To register means, inter alia, to 
initiate an account showing ownership of securities.95  Beneficiary form 
means “a registration of a security which indicates the present owner of 
the security and the intention of the owner regarding the person who will 
become the owner of the security upon the death of the owner.”96  The 
TOD Act provides further that “[a] security, whether evidenced by 
certificate or account, is registered in beneficiary form when the 
registration includes a designation of a beneficiary to take the ownership 
at the death of the owner or the deaths of all multiple owners.”97  This 
registration may be “shown by the words ‘transfer on death’ or the 
abbreviation ‘TOD,’ or by the words ‘pay on death’ or the abbreviation 
‘POD,’ after the name of the registered owner and before the name of a 
beneficiary.”98  It seems, then, that the requirements of the TOD Act can 
be satisfied by certificating the LLC interest and by providing a space 
within which to make the designation.  Another option, indeed the one 
preferred by this Article, is to use the LLC operating agreement, as this 
approach obviates the need to certificate the interest.  
 
 
89.  Id. §§ 6-301 to -311, 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 1, 382–91. 
90.  Id. § 6-307, 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 386. 
91.  Id. § 6-301(4), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 382. 
92.  Id. § 6-301 cmt., 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 382.  
93.  Id. § 6-301(4), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 382. 
94.  For example, as described earlier, a member-managed LLC interest likely falls short 
of the Howey test because of significant member control.  See supra Part VI.A.1. 
95.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-301(2), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 382.  
96.  Id. § 6-301(1), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 382.  
97.  Id. § 6-304, 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 384.  
98.  Id. § 6-305, 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. at 385. 
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B. Do LLC Statutes Permit Transfer-on-Death Provisions in LLC 
Operating Agreements? 
No express provision of the Uniform LLC Acts or typical state LLC 
statutes forbids the use of transfer-on-death provisions in an LLC 
operating agreement.  Consequently, as long as the member complies 
with the jurisdiction’s transfer-on-death statute, no barrier seemingly 
exists to this technique.  To implement the strategy, however, general 
LLC compliance matters must be addressed. 
1. State Law Consequences of a Transfer of the Entire Interest in an 
SMLLC 
Because a transfer of a member’s entire interest in an SMLLC to 
another person is a transaction to which the entity is not a party, the 
transfer triggers very few—if any—state law consequences to the entity.  
The parties should consult the entity’s articles of organization to see if 
any information furnished at formation needs to be changed, the principal 
concerns being the entity’s registered agent, registered office, and 
principal office.  The former member may have been the entity’s 
registered agent.  If so, the registered agent will need to be changed from 
the now-former member.99  Similarly, the registered office will likewise 
need to be changed if the registered agent was the former member.100  
Some states allow these items to be changed by using a simple form 
without the need to formally amend the articles of organization.101  
Finally, the principal office may need to be changed as well.102  It is 
important to attend to these changes in a timely fashion because the 
failure to have a proper registered agent or registered office can lead to 
the involuntary cancellation of the LLC’s existence.103 
 
 
99.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1016 (2011).  Under some state LLC statutes, non-
members can be registered agents only if they are attorneys.  See, e.g., id. § 13.1-1015(A)(2)(a). 
100.  See, e.g., id. §§ 13.1-1015 to -1016. 
101.  See, e.g., id. § 13.1-1016(A); see also Statement of Change of Registered Office 
and/or Registered Agent of a Limited Liability Company, Va. SCC Form LLC 1016, 
https://www.scc.virginia.gov/clk/dom_llc.aspx [https://perma.cc/AAW2-MU6S]. 
102.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1018.1; see also Statement of Change of the 
Principal Office Address of a Limited Liability Company, Va. SCC Form LLC 1018.1, 
https://www.scc.virginia.gov/clk/dom_llc.aspx [https://perma.cc/AAW2-MU6S]. 
103.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1050.3(A)(2). 
 744 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:725 
2. Ott v. Monroe: Judicial Barriers to Transfer Planning 
We recommend that SMLLC operating agreements generally include 
a provision that causes a nonprobate transfer on death of the single 
member’s membership interest.104  However, at least one state supreme 
court decision portends problems for their use.105  In Ott v. Monroe,106 the 
Supreme Court of Virginia construed the Virginia LLC Act to preclude a 
member in a multi-member LLC (MMLLC) from assigning his 
membership interest in the LLC.107  
Although Ott addresses an MMLLC, it is relevant to single-member 
LLCs because Ott flatly prohibited any operating agreement from causing 
an at-death transfer of the member’s membership interest.108 
In Ott, a husband and wife formed an LLC that they owned 80% and 
20% respectively and entered into a written operating agreement.109  The 
salient provisions of the operating agreement were as follows: Paragraph 
2 provided, “Except as provided herein, no Member shall transfer his 
 
104.  See infra Part VI.C.1. 
105.  See F. Philip Manns & Rodney D. Chrisman, The Disastrous Dicta of Ott v. Monroe, 
2011 Va. LEXIS 214 (Nov. 4 2011)., LIBERTY LEGAL J., Fall 2012, at 16 (discussing the 
problems inherent in the Ott decision). 
106.  719 S.E.2d 309 (Va. 2011). 
107.  Id. at 312–13. 
108.  Ott addresses a Virginia MMLLC.  See id. at 310.  For SMLLCs, Virginia is of the 
“entity-adrift” type, as described earlier in the Article, meaning that when the single member 
of an SMLLC dies and the organizational documents do not address the matter, the entity 
continues but without a member.  See supra Part II.  Under Virginia law, where organizational 
documents do not address the matter, the death of an individual member is an event of 
dissociation.  VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1040.1(7)(a).  However, a member’s dissociation does not 
cause dissolution.  Id. § 13.1-1040.2(B).  The “successor in interest [to the deceased member] 
shall continue to hold a membership interest and shall have the same rights that an assignee of 
the membership interest would have under subsection A of § 13.1-1039.”  Id. § 13.1-1040.2(A).  
However, under section 13.1-1039(A), “[e]xcept as provided in subsection A of § 13.1-1040, an 
assignment does not entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the 
limited liability company or to become or to exercise any rights of a member.”  Id. § 13.1-
1039(A) (Supp. 2015).  And, under section 13.1-1040(A), 
an assignee of an interest in a limited liability company may become a member only 
by the consent of a majority of the member-managers (other than the assignor 
member) of a manager-managed limited liability company of which one or more 
members is a manager, or by a majority vote of the members (other than the assignor 
member) of any other limited liability company. 
Id. § 13.1-1040(A) (2011).  Thus, death causes a dissociation but not a dissolution, and the LLC 
lacks a member because the successor in interest to the deceased member of the SMLLC may 
become a member only with the consent of the members other than the assignor member, of 
which there are none. 
109.  Ott, 719 S.E.2d at 310.  
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membership or ownership, or any portion or interest thereof, to any non-
Member person, without the written consent of all other Members, except 
by death, intestacy, devise, or otherwise by operation of law.”110  
Paragraph 10(B) provided, in relevant part, “[N]o Member shall, directly 
or indirectly, transfer, sell, give, encumber, assign, pledge, or otherwise 
deal with or dispose of all or any part of his Membership Interest now 
owned or subsequently acquired by him, other than as provided for in this 
Agreement.”111  Paragraph 10(C) provided that “any Member . . . may 
transfer all or any portion of the Member’s Interest at any time 
to . . . [o]ther Members [or] [t]he spouse, children or other descendants 
of any Member.”112 
The husband died, and his will left his entire estate to his daughter.113  
The daughter asserted ownership of her deceased father’s 80% interest in 
the LLC.114  She held a meeting in which she purported to remove the 
wife as manager of the LLC and install herself, the daughter, as 
manager.115  The wife then sued the daughter, arguing that the daughter 
acceded only to her late husband’s financial rights in the LLC.116  The trial 
court agreed with the wife by holding that the husband was dissociated 
from the company at his death, which terminated his control rights, and, 
therefore, the daughter received only the father’s financial rights in the 
LLC.117  The daughter appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.118 
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court.119  The court 
noted that, except as provided in the articles of organization or operating 
agreement, section 13.1-1040.1(7)(a) of the Code of Virginia dissociates 
a member upon the member’s death and terminates the member’s control 
rights in the company.120  The court rejected the daughter’s assertion that 
Paragraph 2 of the operating agreement countered section 13.1-
1040.1(7)(a)’s default rule because, according to the court, Paragraph 2 
 
110.  Id.  
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. (alteration in original). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id.  
116.  Id.  
117.  Id.; see also Ott v. Monroe, No. CL08-1269, 2010 WL 8749605 (Stafford Cty. Cir. Ct. 
June 23, 2010). 
118.  Ott, 719 S.E.2d. at 310. 
119.  Id. at 313. 
120.  Id. at 312. 
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“lack[ed] specific language that would constitute an exception to the rule 
of dissociation.”121  Consequently, the daughter became a “mere 
assignee,” i.e., acceded to the financial interest only.122 
So far, so good—this is a correct and proper interpretation of Virginia 
law and general LLC law regarding multi-member LLCs.123  That is, 
without specific language in an organizational document to the contrary, 
death dissociates a member, his remaining interest is only a financial 
interest and not a managerial interest, and that financial interest is subject 
to disposition as personal property.124  Despite having completely 
resolved the case at that point, the Supreme Court of Virginia proceeded 
to further elucidate (disastrously so) the Virginia LLC Act.  
The court noted that, even if Paragraph 2 had superseded the default 
death-dissociation rule, “it is not possible for a member unilaterally to 
alienate his personal control interest in a limited liability company.”125  
The court reasoned that because the words “[u]nless otherwise provided 
in the articles of organization or an operating agreement” did not appear 
in the same statutory sentence that regards an assignee becoming a 
member,126 the assignee-admission rule is a mandatory rule that cannot 
be changed.127  This dicta is completely wrong.128 
First, the Ott dicta runs counter to the Virginia LLC Act because it 
reads section 13.1-1039 in isolation and, therefore, fails to consider the 
effect of section 13.1-1040.129  Section 13.1-1040—the assignee-admission 
rule—expressly contemplates that an organic document can change the 
 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1040.2 (2011) (noting that, despite dissociation, 
a member’s financial interest remains intact); id. § 13.1-1039 (Supp. 2015) (providing that a 
member’s financial interest is assignable in whole or in part). 
123.  As noted earlier, with an SMLLC, upon death of the sole member, dissolution looms 
upon dissociation without an effective mechanism to create a new member.  By contrast, with 
an MMLLC, dissociation does not trigger dissolution because other members exist.  See supra 
Part II. 
124.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1038 (2011) (“A membership interest in a limited liability 
company is personal property.”). 
125.  Ott, 719 S.E.2d at 312. 
126.  Id.  At the time of Ott, section 13.1-1039(A) read, in relevant part, “[a]n assignment 
does not entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the limited liability 
company or to become or to exercise any rights of a member.”  Id. 312–13 (quoting VA. CODE 
ANN. § 13.1039(A) (2006)).  
127.  See id. at 312–13. 
128.  See Manns & Chrisman, supra note 105, at 18. 
129.  Id. at 16.  
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process by which a financial assignee becomes a management member.130  
Second, the Ott dicta runs counter to general partnership law principles, 
which serve as the theoretical underpinning of state LLC law.  For 
example, the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act permits the partnership 
agreement to override the default rule and provide that control rights 
transfer to assignees.131  Third, the Ott dicta “trumps the freedom of 
contract theory, which is the underlying policy of virtually all LLC 
statutes.”132 
Although Ott did not address TOD designations, its rationale is 
problematic for the deathtime planning of LLC control rights, regardless 
of the form, e.g., testamentary or non-testamentary transfer.  If the Ott 
reasoning is sound—which the authors contend that it is not—then even 
if an SMLLC member makes a TOD designation, the donee arguably 
 
130.  Section 13.1-1040 provides:  
Except as otherwise provided in writing in the articles of organization or an 
operating agreement, an assignee of an interest in a limited liability company may 
become a member only by the consent of a majority of the member-managers (other 
than the assignor member) of a manager-managed limited liability company of which 
one or more members is a manager, or by a majority vote of the members (other than 
the assignor member) of any other limited liability company. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1040 (2011) (emphasis added). 
131.  See id. §§ 50-73.81, .99(I), .106 (2009); see also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 105, 402, 502, 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2013), 6 U.L.A. 1, 27–29, 89–90, 109 (2015), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Partnership/UPA%20_Final_2014_2015aug19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X4V8-W2CX]. 
132.  Manns & Chrisman, supra note 105, at 17; see also Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and 
the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
189, 225 (2011) (“Delaware LLCs are regarded as ‘creatures of contract,’ representing a 
voluntary, contractual relationship among private parties.”).  Moreover, “limited liability 
companies are creatures of contract, ‘designed to afford the maximum amount of freedom of 
contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.’”  TravelCenters of Am., LLC 
v. Brog, No. 3516-CC, 2008 WL 1746987, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008) (quoting In re Grupo 
Dos Chiles, LLC, No. Civ.A. 1447-N, 2006 WL 668443, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2006)).  
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accedes only to the financial rights.133  This, of course, is problematic 
because who—if anyone—is in control of the entity?134  
C. Recommended Provisions in SMLLC Operating Agreements 
Widely available forms for SMLLCs do not address the death of the 
sole member of an SMLLC.135  We propose the following transfer-on-
death provision for a form SMLLC Operating Agreement. 
1. Suggested Form Language 
Article xx. Transfer on Death. 
Sole Member designates, pursuant to <cite to state version of Uniform 
Probate Code section 6-101>, the following transfer-on-death 
beneficiaries to acquire, upon Sole Member’s death, Sole Member’s entire 
Interest existing at the time of Sole Member’s death: TOD1, if TOD1 
survives Sole Member by y hours [days], and if not, then to TOD2, 
provided TOD2 survives Sole Member by z hours [days].  “Interest” 
means the ownership interest of a Member in the Company, including, 
without limitation, management rights, financial rights, and other benefits 
under this Operating Agreement and the <state LLC Act>. 
Article xy. Tax Treatment. 
The Company intends to be a single-member LLC and a “disregarded 
entity” for income tax purposes, so that Company’s activities will be 
reflected on the sole member’s individual income tax return.  If at any 
time there are two or more Members, this Agreement must be revised to 
address the relative rights and obligations of such other Members and to 
address any change in the status of the Company for income tax purposes. 
Sole member = the name of the sole member 
TOD1 = name of primary transfer-on-death beneficiar[ies] 
TOD2 = name of contingent transfer-on-death beneficiar[ies] 
 
133.  In the wake of Ott, the Virginia General Assembly amended section 13.1-1039 by 
adding the magic language required by the Supreme Court of Virginia.  Act of April 3, 2013, 
ch. 772, 2013 Va. Acts 1529, 1530.  Section 13.1-1039 now reads, in relevant part, “Unless 
otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an operating agreement, such an assignment 
entitles the assignee to receive, to the extent assigned, only any share of profits and losses and 
distributions to which the assignor would be entitled.”  VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1039(A) (Supp. 
2015) (emphasis added).  The reasoning of Ott’s dicta—that the magic statutory language is 
needed on a rule-by-rule basis to make any rule non-mandatory—has not been rebuffed, 
however.  At least in Virginia, then, the Ott dicta now lies in wait for other statutory provisions 
and related organic document clauses to be challenged. 
134.  See supra Part III. 
135.  See supra Parts IV, V. 
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2. Discussion 
a. Negating the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act 
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (USDA), or its functional 
equivalent, has been adopted in all states.136  Under the USDA, the 
beneficiary of a transfer-on-death provision must survive the transferor 
by 120 hours.137  Such a gap is not optimal with an SMLLC because during 
the gap no member would exist.  Consequently, when authority to act may 
be required immediately upon the death of the single member, the drafter 
may want to negate the 120-hour rule by expressly requiring survival but 
expressly shortening the survival period.  By contrast, if the need to act 
immediately is not expected, the drafter may want to lengthen the 
survival period to obviate the need for a probate in the estate of the TOD 
beneficiary if she dies soon after the original sole member. 
b. Provision Addressing Income Tax Treatment 
The default income tax treatment for SMLLC operations is simple: 
the activities are reported on the sole member’s individual income tax 
return.138  By contrast, the default income tax treatment for MMLLC 
operations is quite complex: The entity is taxed as a partnership.139  The 
purpose of the tax treatment article in our proposed form language is to 
alert the member(s) to consider the federal tax consequences of 
transferring SMLLC interests, which are considered in the next part.140 
However, because the federal gift and federal estate tax consequences 
of transfers of SMLLC interests have not been resolved, we first consider 
the tax consequences of transfers of SMLLC interests by sale and then by 
lifetime and deathtime gift. 
 
 
 
136.  The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was originally promulgated in 1940 and was 
adopted in forty-nine states.  Simultaneous Death Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Simultaneous%20Death%20Act [https://perma.cc
/Z3NJ-HXJS] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016). 
137.  UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993), 8B U.L.A. 
315, 324 (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/simultaneous%20death/USDA_201
1_Final%20Act_2014sep10.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFT5-MVYF].  
138.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (2015). 
139.  See id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). 
140.  See infra Part VII. 
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VII. FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFERRING SMLLC 
INTERESTS 
In business entity taxation, ownership interests in entities are nearly 
always treated separately from the interests that the entity has in its assets 
and operations.  However, under the check-the-box regulations, an 
SMLLC, by default, is “[d]isregarded as an entity separate from its 
owner.”141  In other words, the entity does not exist for classification 
purposes, and its owner is treated as operating a sole proprietorship.142 
A. Income Taxation of Transfers of SMLLC Interests 
Because the SMLLC is a disregarded entity for income tax purposes, 
the sale of an entire interest in an SMLLC, unlike other transfers of 
business interests, constitutes a sale of each of the underlying assets of the 
entity.143  If the sole member of an SMLLC sells his entire interest in the 
SMLLC to another person, the member-seller calculates the gain or loss 
from the sale based on the difference between the sales price of the 
interest (known as the amount realized)144 and the constituent income tax 
basis145 of each of the entity’s assets.146  The character of gain on the sale 
of each asset would depend on the nature of the underlying asset (e.g., 
capital or ordinary).147  The gain or loss would be long- or short-term 
based on the holding period that the member (entity) held each asset.148  
The buyer takes a basis in the purchased assets based on the consideration 
paid for those assets,149 which should be allocated in the purchase 
 
141.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii).  The SMLLC may elect to be taxed as an 
association (i.e., a corporation).  See id. § 301.7701-3(a) (“[A]n eligible entity with a single 
owner can elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity separate from 
its owner.”). 
142.  Id. § 301.7701-2(a) (“[I]f the entity is disregarded, its activities are treated in the 
same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch, or division of the owner.”). 
143.  See id. § 301.7701-3; Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434.  Although, the sale of a 
partnership interest and S corporation stock can also result in a partial asset look-through in 
certain instances (e.g., for collectibles gain).  See I.R.C. §§ 1, 741, 751 (2012); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1(h)-1.  The check-the-box regulations were designed to simplify the tax classification of 
LLCs.  See, e.g., Roger F. Pillow et al., Simplified Entity Classification Under the Final Check-
the-Box Regulations, 86 J. TAX’N 197, 208 (1997).  
144.  I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
145.  See id. §§ 1011–12, 1016. 
146.  Id. § 1001; see also Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434.  
147.  I.R.C. § 1221.  
148.  Id. § 1223.  
149.  Id. §§ 1011–12.  
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agreement.150  If there is no allocation agreement, the allocation rules of 
§ 338(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code151 control (by virtue of § 1060, 
discussed next).  
The sale of an entire interest in an SMLLC triggers the applicable 
asset acquisition rules of § 1060 of the Internal Revenue Code.152  An 
“applicable asset acquisition” is any transfer of assets that meets two 
requirements: (1) the assets “constitute a trade or business” and (2) “the 
transferee’s basis in such assets is determined wholly by reference to the 
consideration paid for such assets.”153  In our hypothetical, when the 
entire interest in an SMLLC is transferred, an applicable asset acquisition 
occurs.  First, the SMLLC’s assets constitute a trade or business.154  
Second, because the SMLLC is disregarded, the purchaser is, in the tax 
sense, buying the individual assets from the seller; thus, his basis in those 
assets is determined by the consideration paid.155  Under § 1060, the 
parties may agree in writing about the allocation of the consideration and 
the fair market value of the entity’s assets.156  The agreement binds both 
the transferee and the transferor unless the Internal Revenue Service 
(Service) determines that such allocation is not appropriate.157  In the 
absence of an allocation agreement—or if the Service rejects the 
proffered allocation—the rules of § 338(b)(5) govern.158  
 
150.  See id. § 1060(a).  
151.  See id.  Section 338 is another instance in which a sale of an interest in an entity—
corporate stock—is treated as a sale of assets by the entity.  Id. § 338.  An asset sale is normally 
preferable to a stock sale because the purchaser obtains a stepped-up basis in the purchased 
assets; by contrast, in a straight stock sale, the purchaser takes a cost basis in the purchased 
securities, with no change in the basis of the company’s assets.  Id. § 338(b).  
152.  See, e.g., BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 85, ¶ 8.07[1][a][iii]. 
153.  I.R.C. § 1060(c). 
154.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(b)(2)(i) (2015); id. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(ii) (defining “trade or 
business”).  The activities of an SMLLC might not rise to the level of a trade or business, if for 
instance it only held property for investment.  However, in our hypothetical, the SMLLC is 
operating a business. 
155.  See I.R.C. §§ 1011–12. 
156.  Id. § 1060(a) (flush language).  
157.  Id.  
158.  Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.338-6.  Section 338 operates by using a residual method 
of calculation that allocates the stock purchase price to assets in seven asset classes.  Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.338-6(b).  Class I assets are cash and general deposit accounts, other than certificates of 
deposit; Class II assets are actively traded personal property, certificates of deposit, and foreign 
currency; Class III assets are “assets that the taxpayer marks to market at least annually for 
[f]ederal income tax purposes and debt instruments”; Class IV assets are stock in trade of the 
taxpayer and inventory; Class V assets are all assets other than Class I, II, III, IV, VI, and VII 
assets; Class VI assets are § 197 intangibles other than goodwill and going concern value; Class 
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B. Gift Taxation of Transfers of SMLLC Interests 
If the SMLLC interest is instead transferred by lifetime gift, two 
mutually exclusive tax scenarios potentially arise.  
1. Disregarding the SMLLC: Analogy to Income Tax 
First, under the check-the-box regulations, the Service’s rationale in 
Revenue Ruling 99-5,159 and analogy to the sale of an SMLLC member’s 
interest, the gift of an SMLLC interest would be deemed a transfer of 
each of the entity’s assets.  Thus, the member-donor does not have a 
realization event, and the donee recognizes no income upon receipt of the 
gift.160  The donee will take a transferred basis in the assets,161 except that 
if the donor’s basis of an asset is less than its fair market value, then for 
purposes of determining loss, the basis in the hands of the donee for that 
asset will be limited to the fair market value on the date of gift.162 
The second tax scenario is that the SMLLC—notwithstanding the 
check-the-box regulations—will be regarded for federal gift tax purposes, 
and the transaction will be considered a transfer of the actual SMLLC 
interest, not the underlying assets.  Under this scenario, the donor-
member still does not have a realization event, and the donee still 
recognizes no income upon receipt of the SMLLC-interest gift.163  
However, the donee will take a transferred basis in the SMLLC interest 
(not the underlying assets), except that if the basis of the SMLLC interest 
is less than its fair market value, then for purposes of determining loss, 
the basis in the hands of the donee of the SMLLC interest will be limited 
to the fair market value on the date of gift.164  Scenario two potentially 
exists because of the U.S. Tax Court’s controversial decision in Pierre v. 
Commissioner.165 
 
VII assets are goodwill and going concern value.  Id.  In effect, therefore, typically the purchaser 
will take a fair market value basis in all non-goodwill, non-going concern assets.  See id.  Any 
residual consideration that remains (after valuing the Class I through Class VI assets) will be 
allocated to goodwill and going concern value.  Id.  
159.  Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434. 
160.  See I.R.C. § 102.  
161.  Id. § 7701(a)(43) (“The term ‘transferred basis property’ means property having a 
basis determined under any provision of subtitle A (or under any corresponding provision of 
prior income tax law) providing that the basis shall be determined in whole or in part by 
reference to the basis in the hands of the donor, grantor, or other transferor.”). 
162.  Id. § 1015. 
163.  Id. § 102. 
164.  Id. § 1015. 
165.  133 T.C. 24 (2009).  
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2. Regarding the Disregarded SMLLC: Pierre v. Commissioner 
In Pierre, Ms. Pierre organized an SMLLC in New York and 
contributed $4.25 million to it.166  A few days later, she transferred her 
interest in the SMLLC to two trusts,167 and both trusts were treated as 
entities separate from Pierre.168  Pierre filed a gift tax return, treated the 
gifts as transfers of interests in the entity (rather than gifts of the entity’s 
assets), and applied valuation discounts typically used when valuing gifts 
of interests in entities.169  The Service, however, determined that the 
transfer was properly treated as gifts of proportionate shares of the 
underlying assets, not as interests in the SMLLC.170  
The Service argued that the check-the-box regulations require that 
the SMLLC be disregarded for federal gift tax purposes so that 
“petitioner’s transfers of interests in [the SMLLC] should be ‘treated’ as 
transfers of cash and marketable securities” (which were the assets of the 
SMLLC).171  Pierre argued that, for federal gift tax purposes, state law, 
rather than the federal tax check-the-box regulations, determined the 
nature of interest in property transferred and the legal rights inherent in 
that gifted property.172  Because New York state law classified an LLC 
interest as personal property and provided that an LLC member has no 
discrete property interest in the entity’s assets,173 Pierre argued that she 
did not transfer the entity’s assets but instead transferred an SMLLC 
interest for which lack of control and lack of marketability discounts were 
appropriate when valuing her gifts.174  
The Tax Court first examined the history of the gift tax valuation 
regime.  It noted that the amount of a gift of property “is the value of the 
 
166.  Id. at 25.  
167.  Id.  The actual transaction occurred in several steps that resulted in a complete 
transfer of the entire SMLLC interest.  Id. 
168.  Certain trusts are not regarded as an entity separate from the person who creates 
the trust.  See I.R.C. § 671.  Often called “grantor trusts,” they are defined in subpart E of 
subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code.  Id. §§ 671–79.  A revocable living trust is the 
archetypal grantor trust.  Id. § 676.  When a revocable living trust owns the sole interest in an 
SMLLC, there is a double look through (once through the trust and once through the LLC) to 
treat the trust’s grantor as the owner of the LLC’s assets.  That double look through is one of 
the strategies to address the death of the sole member.  See supra Part V. 
169.  Pierre, 133 T.C. at 26. 
170.  Id.  
171.  Id. at 27. 
172.  Id.  
173.  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 601 (McKinney 2007).  
174.  Pierre, 133 T.C. at 27. 
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property at the date of the gift”175 and that “[i]t is the value of the property 
passing from the donor that determines the amount of the gift.”176  The 
court then turned to Supreme Court case law and noted that the gift tax 
is an excise tax, not a direct tax.177  Further synthesizing the Supreme 
Court’s transfer tax cases, the Tax Court noted that “[a] fundamental 
premise of transfer taxation is that State law creates property rights and 
interests, and Federal tax law then defines the tax treatment of those 
property rights.”178  Consequently, “the Internal Revenue Code creates 
‘no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, 
to rights created under state law.’”179  The Tax Court described the 
process of determining the nature and amount of a gift under federal gift 
tax law as follows: “(1) [determine] under State law . . . the property 
interest that the donor transferred, (2) [determine] the fair market value 
of the transferred property interest and the amount of the transfer to be 
taxed, and (3) [calculate] the Federal gift tax due on the transfer . . . .”180 
Applying that process, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer did not 
have a property interest in the underlying SMLLC assets and federal law 
could not create taxable property rights in those assets.181  Therefore, 
“pursuant to the historical Federal gift tax valuation regime, petitioner’s 
gift tax liability is determined by the value of the transferred interests in 
[the SMLLC], not by a hypothetical transfer of the underlying assets of 
[the SMLLC].”182 
The Tax Court then examined whether the check-the-box regulations 
changed the historic gift tax valuation approach.  Treasury Regulation 
section 301.7701-1(a)(1) provides:  
Classification of organizations for federal tax 
purposes. . . . The Internal Revenue Code prescribes the 
classification of various organizations for federal tax purposes.  
 
175.  Id. at 28 (citing I.R.C. § 2512(a) (2006)). 
176.  Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (2009)). 
177.  Id. (citing Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929)). 
178.  Id. at 29 (citing Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78 (1940)). 
179.  Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985)); see 
also Morgan, 309 U.S. at 80–81 (“State law creates legal interests and rights.  The federal 
revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.  Our duty is to 
ascertain the meaning of the words used to specify the thing taxed.  If it is found in a given case 
that an interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed, the federal 
law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right by state law.”). 
180.  Pierre, 133 T.C. at 35. 
181.  Id. at 36.  
182.  Id. at 30. 
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Whether an organization is an entity separate from its owners for 
federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not 
depend on whether the organization is recognized as an entity 
under local law.183 
Section 301.7701-3(a) and (b), entitled “Classification of certain 
business entities,” provides: 
(a) . . . A business entity . . . can elect its classification for 
federal tax purposes as provided in this section. . . . [A]n eligible 
entity with a single owner can elect to be classified as an 
association or to be disregarded as an entity separate from its 
owner.  Paragraph (b) of this section provides a default 
classification for an eligible entity that does not make an 
election. . . . 
(b) Classification of eligible entities that do not file an election—
(1) . . . Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, 
unless the entity elects otherwise, a domestic eligible entity is— 
. . . . 
(ii) Disregarded as an entity separate from its owner if it has a 
single owner.184 
As the Tax Court noted, “the default classification for an entity with 
a single owner is that the entity is disregarded as an entity separate from 
its owner.”185  The Service cited cases that it believed supported its 
position that “valid State law restrictions must be ignored for the purpose 
of determining the interest being transferred under the Federal estate and 
gift tax regime.”186  The Tax Court distinguished these cases, however, 
and did not find them controlling.187  The Tax Court thus emphasized that 
[n]either the check-the-box regulations nor the cases cited by [the 
Service] support or compel a conclusion that the existence of an 
entity validly formed under applicable State law must be ignored 
in determining how the transfer of a property interest in that entity 
is taxed under Federal gift tax provisions.188 
 
183.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). 
184.  Id. § 301.7701-3(a), (b) (emphasis added). 
185.  Pierre, 133 T.C. at 32. 
186.  Id. at 32 (citing McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Shepherd v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 376 (2000), aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002); Senda v. 
Comm’r, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’g 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 8 (2004)). 
187.  Id. at 32–33. 
188.  Id. at 35. 
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In sum, the Tax Court held that, although the check-the-box 
regulations govern how a single-member LLC will be taxed for federal 
income tax purposes, the regulations do not “apply to disregard the LLC 
in determining how a donor must be taxed under the Federal gift tax 
provisions on a transfer of an ownership interest in the LLC.”189  
Adopting the Service’s position—that the SMLLC be disregarded for gift 
tax purposes—would, according to the Tax Court, result in federal law 
defining property rights and would go “far beyond classifying the 
[SMLLC] for tax purposes.”190  Moreover, “[t]o conclude that because an 
entity elected the classification rules set forth in the check-the-box 
regulations, the long-established Federal gift tax valuation regime is 
overturned as to [SMLLCs] would be ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the 
Federal estate and gift tax statutes as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court.”191 
Pierre was a fractured decision;192 it generated a concurring opinion 
and two dissenting opinions.  Judge Cohen wrote a concurring opinion 
with the express purpose of squaring Pierre with the court’s earlier 
decision in Medical Practice Solutions, LLC v. Commissioner,193 which 
had applied the check-the-box regulations to employment taxes.194  The 
first dissent in Pierre, written by Judge Halpern, argued that the check-
the-box regulations created a “rule of unity” between the proprietor and 
 
189.  Id.  
190.  Id.  
191.  Id.  On this point, Pierre raises an interesting issue of administrative law.  By stating 
that applying the check-the-box regulations to the long-established federal gift tax valuation 
regime would be “manifestly incompatible” with the federal estate and gift tax statutes as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Tax Court likely forecloses Treasury’s power, at least 
before the Tax Court, to clarify by regulation that SMLLCs are disregarded for federal estate 
and gift tax purposes.  Under National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), an agency usually can adopt an interpretation of a statute contrary 
to prior judicial decisions, with one glaring exception.  “[A] judicial precedent holding that the 
statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for 
the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”  Id. at 982–83.  Pierre would 
appear to be a judicial precedent unambiguously foreclosing the Service’s argument that the 
disregarded entity rule of the check-the-box regulations applies to the federal estate and tax 
statutes. 
192.  The decision was nine to six: Judges Cohen, Foley, Vasquez, Thornton, Marvel, 
Goeke, Wherry, Gustafson, and Morrison in the majority; and Judges Halpern, Kroupa, 
Holmes, Colvin, Gale, and Paris dissenting.  Pierre, 133 T.C. at 36, 41, 52, 60. 
193.  Med. Practice Sols., LLC v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 125 (2009). 
194.  Medical Practice Solutions, LLC held that the check-the-box regulations were valid 
insofar as they allowed the collection of employment taxes against the sole member of an 
SMLLC.  Id. at 126, 130. 
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the SMLLC, which dictated the result advanced by the Service.195  The 
second dissent, written by Judge Kroupa, argued that the majority 
opinion ignored the plain text and effectively invalidated the check-the-
box regulations because those regulations require that the SMLLC be 
disregarded for federal tax purposes, i.e., the entire tax code (including 
federal gift taxation).196 
C. Estate Taxation of SMLLC Interests 
Although Pierre dealt with gift tax valuation,197 Pierre’s rationale 
could apply equally to estate tax valuation and taxation.  The estate tax is 
separate from the income tax and from the gift tax: Income taxes are 
addressed in chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code;198 gift taxes in 
chapter 12;199 and estate taxes in chapter 11.200  However, gift tax and 
estate tax provisions typically are construed in the same manner.201  Thus, 
Pierre may apply in the estate tax context.   
However, for an SMLLC under our hypothetical, the Service, not the 
estate, typically would prefer the Pierre rule.  Pierre makes valuation 
discounts available, but such discounts will be optimal only for taxpayers 
whose federal taxable estates exceed the applicable exclusion amount,202 
now $5.43 million.203  In our hypothetical SMLLC, Founder operates a 
substantial business enterprise with minimally tailored organizational 
documents.  In this Article we address how the optimal, minimally 
tailored organizational documents would address the death of the sole 
member of an SMLLC.  If a sole member’s wealth exceeded $5 million, 
we would expect him to obtain more sophisticated documents and advice, 
which likely would result in structures in which valuation discounts would 
be pursued when making lifetime gifts and estate tax valuations.  
Conversely, Founder of our hypothetical SMLLC, with wealth below $5 
 
195.  Pierre, 133 T.C. at 43 (Halpern, J., dissenting). 
196.  Id. at 52–53 (Kroupa, J., dissenting). 
197.  Pierre, 133 T.C. 24.  
198.  I.R.C. §§ 1–1400U-3 (2012). 
199.  Id. §§ 2501–24. 
200.  Id. §§ 2001–10. 
201.  Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950) (“The federal estate tax and the federal 
gift tax, as held in a line of cases ending with Commissioner v. Wemyss, and Merrill v. Fahs, are 
construed in pari materia, since the purpose of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax by 
preventing tax-free depletion of the transferor’s estate during his lifetime.” (citations omitted)). 
202.  See I.R.C. § 2010(c). 
203.  Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 867 (providing inflation-adjusted amounts). 
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million, does not need (or want) a valuation discount.204  A valuation 
discount, moreover, does not benefit an estate not subject to estate tax, 
and it actually works against the beneficiary of that estate who suffers a 
lower income tax basis than when Pierre applies.205 
Although the Service has not made this argument (yet), the estate tax 
consequences to an SMLLC after Pierre are murky.  While it would seem 
simplest to apply Revenue Ruling 99-5 and value each underlying 
SMLLC asset on the estate tax return of the deceased member, the 
rationale of Pierre cuts against this.206  If we are to value the SMLLC 
interest in the gift tax context, it would seem as though that rationale 
ought to apply in equal measure in the estate tax context.  Consequently, 
the personal representative would need to value and report the SMLLC 
interest on the estate tax return.207  
D. Transfer-on-Death Designation Taxation 
1. Transfer-on-Death Designation in Favor of One Beneficiary 
If a single member makes a transfer-on-death designation for his or 
her SMLLC interest, there are no immediate tax consequences.  The 
reason for this is twofold: First, the designation does not act as a sale or 
other disposition of property because there is no realization event.208  
Second, there are no gift tax consequences because the designation is not 
a completed gift, as the designation remains revocable.209  Consequently, 
 
204.  Conversely, when an owner of an LLC expects to have a taxable estate, she typically 
desires valuation discounts, and usually can obtain them, provided she avoids § 2036(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  See Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and 
Adequate Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REV. 531, 579 (2009) (citing Estate of Bongard, 124 T.C. 
95, 133 (2005)) (“The judicial standard articulated in Estate of Bongard for satisfying the 
adequate and full consideration exception to section 2036(a) therefore turns on the credibility 
of the purported non-tax reasons for the entity’s formation.”). 
205.  See I.R.C. § 1014(f) (West Supp. 2015). 
206.  See Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 24 (2009).  
207.  We note that there is also a dearth of commentary on the effect of Pierre on the 
estate tax scheme.  We hope to elucidate this in future scholarship. 
208.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (noting that a realization event normally requires a 
“sale or other disposition of property”); see also Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 
561–62 (1991) (citing Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 540–42 (1925); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 
U.S. 242, 253–54 (1924); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 173 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 
252 U.S. 189, 207–12 (1920)) (“[A] taxpayer realizes taxable income only if the properties 
exchanged are ‘materially’ or ‘essentially’ different.”). 
209.  See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511; see also Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds: The 
Nonprobate Revolution Continues, 41 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 529, 549 (2006). 
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all of the tax consequences of a TOD designation arise at the death of the 
donor. 
Property that is subject to a transfer-on-death designation is included 
in a decedent’s federal gross estate under § 2038 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.210  Section 2038 includes “the value of any interest in property 
transferred by the decedent . . . if the enjoyment of the interest was 
subject at the date of the decedent’s death to any change through the 
exercise of a power by the decedent to alter, amend, revoke, or 
terminate . . . .”211  The donee will not recognize income upon receipt,212 
and because the interest was included in the decedent’s federal gross 
estate, the donee will take a basis of the interest’s fair market value on 
the date of death.213  
However, when determining the donee’s income tax basis, we again 
are confronted with the Pierre conundrum: What is deemed transferred 
for federal income tax purposes—the SMLLC interest (à la Pierre) or the 
underlying assets (à la Revenue Ruling 99-5)?  This is a paramount 
distinction for basis purposes.  What will accede to the coveted step-up in 
basis,214 the underlying assets or the SMLLC interest? 
If Revenue Ruling 99-5 governs, then the SMLLC assets are deemed 
transferred, and those assets receive the step-up in basis provided by 
§ 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code.215  If, however, Pierre’s rationale 
can be imported to the transfer-on-death context, the transfer of an 
SMLLC interest might be treated as a transfer of the ownership interest, 
not the underlying assets (contrary to the rationale of Revenue Ruling 
99-5).  And there is, in fact, a cogent argument to import Pierre.  First, the 
federal gift tax is an excise tax on the ability to transfer property during 
life.216  Similarly, the federal estate tax is an excise tax on the ability to 
transfer property at death.217  Second, the state law interest that the 
 
210.  See Gary, supra note 209, at 549.  Section 2036 also would include property subject 
to a TOD designation.  I.R.C. § 2036. 
211.  Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (2015). 
212.  I.R.C. § 102.  
213.  Id. § 1014. 
214.  Although § 1014 can cause a step-down in basis, business assets nearly always have 
bases less than their value, principally because of accelerated depreciation.  See I.R.C. §§ 167–
68, 179, 1016(a)(2); Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687. 
215.  See I.R.C. § 1014; Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434.  
216.  Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 340 (1984) (“The gift tax is an excise tax on 
transfers of property . . . .”); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138 (1929). 
217.  United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 355 (1988) (“The estate tax is a 
form of excise tax.”); U.S. Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939) (noting that the federal 
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decedent owned is the SMLLC interest, not that of the underlying 
assets.218  Thus, the decedent possessed no direct property rights in those 
underlying assets to which the federal estate tax could attach.  Third, the 
historical estate tax scheme is very similar—if not identical, except with 
respect to the lifetime vs. deathtime distinction—to the gift tax regime in 
Pierre.219  
Note that if Pierre applies, then a mismatch could occur between the 
basis of the one new owner of the SMLLC in her SMLLC interest and the 
entity’s basis in its assets.  In the partnership context, the mismatch could 
be cured with a § 754 election.220  However, in the nebulous twilight zone 
of Pierre and the check-the-box regulations, no such adjustment 
mechanism exists.  
2. Transfer-on-Death Designation in Favor of Multiple Beneficiaries 
A TOD designation can be made in favor of multiple beneficiaries.221  
The most analogous authority on point for the taxation of this situation is 
Revenue Ruling 99-5, which describes “the federal income tax 
consequences when a single member limited liability company that is 
disregarded as an entity separate from its owner under [the check-the-
box regulations] becomes an entity with more than one owner that is 
classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes.”222  Revenue Ruling 
99-5 describes two situations: first, an unrelated person, B, purchases 50% 
of an SMLLC from the then-single member, A, and the two continue to 
operate the LLC; second, an unrelated person, B, contributes money to 
the LLC in exchange for a 50% interest in the entity, whose operations 
continue.223  
 
estate tax “is an excise imposed upon the transfer of or shifting in relationships to property at 
death”); Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1936) (“An estate tax is an excise 
tax upon the privilege of transferring or transmitting property by reason of death and is not a 
tax on the property itself.”). 
218.  See Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 24, 29–30 (2009). 
219.  In other words, the process for applying the federal estate tax is identical to the gift 
tax process identified in Pierre; that is: (1) determine under state law the property interest that 
the decedent transferred; (2) determine the fair market value of that transferred interest; and 
(3) calculate the federal estate tax due on that transfer.  See id. at 35.  
220.  I.R.C. § 754.  
221.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-307 & cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2010), 8 
pt. 3 U.L.A. 1, 386 (2010). 
222.  Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434.  
223.  Id.  
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Situation 1 closely resembles the state law transaction being 
effectuated by a multi-beneficiary TOD designation—i.e., the SMLLC is 
being converted into a MMLC by the transfer of LLC interest from the 
single member.  According to the Revenue Ruling, A (the single member) 
is deemed to be selling the underlying assets to B, the unrelated person; 
A and B are then deemed to contribute the underlying assets to a new 
partnership under § 721 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the 
traditional partnership contribution rules apply.224  
With a multi-beneficiary TOD designation, the problems in the 
twilight zone of Pierre and the check-the-box regulations continue.  What 
will be the respective bases of the TOD beneficiaries, as they contribute 
the assets to the new partnership? 
3. Transfer-on-Death Designation for an SMLLC That Has an S-
Corporation Election in Effect 
Not all SMLLCs are classified as disregarded entities.  For example, 
some SMLLCs elect to be taxed as S corporations to, inter alia, save on 
self-employment taxes.225  If an SMLLC makes an election to be taxed as 
a C or S corporation, the Pierre tension seemingly does not exist because 
the entity is not treated as a disregarded entity—the SMLLC is a 
corporation for federal tax purposes.  Consequently, a transfer of the 
SMLLC interest, which is now effectively stock for tax purposes, is 
valued, rather than valuing the entity’s assets.  The personal 
representative would value the LLC interest (i.e., stock equivalent) for 
estate tax purposes.  The beneficiaries would recognize no income upon 
receipt226 and would take a basis in the interest of its fair market value on 
the date of death.227  In this case, a multi-beneficiary TOD designation 
 
224.  See I.R.C. §§ 721–23, 1223.  The possible broader application of Pierre, however, 
makes the ultimate analysis uncertain.  Applying Pierre broadly, Revenue Ruling 99-5 falls 
apart in the multiple-beneficiary TOD situation, even though the fact scenario is roughly 
equivalent.  Applying Pierre’s rationale, it seems that the effect of a multiple-beneficiary TOD 
designation results in the following consequences: (1) the beneficiaries have no gross income 
upon receipt of the LLC interest; (2) the beneficiaries take a basis in their LLC interest of the 
fair market value at the date of death; (3) the SMLLC is converted to a partnership by 
operation of law and application of the check-the-box regulations; and (4) the partnership’s 
inside basis in the various assets will remain the same as that which the SMLLC had. 
225.  See, e.g., Timothy M. Todd, Multiple-Entity Planning to Reduce Self-Employment 
Taxes: Recent Cases Demonstrate the Pitfalls & How to Avoid Them, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., 
Apr.–May 2011, at 31. 
226.  I.R.C. § 102.  
227.  Id. § 1014.  
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effectuates no change in entity but rather adds shareholders to the 
“corporation.” 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The forms from which SMLLC organizational documents are 
routinely drawn do not address the death of the sole member.  The default 
statutory rules, which apply when the organizational documents are silent 
on the subject, do not handle the matter well either.  The four models 
upon which the default statutory rules are based cause a dissolution from 
which continuation is either impossible or difficult to implement.  In order 
to ensure optimal operation of the SMLLC’s business, continuation 
should occur, yet neither existing forms nor default rules reach that result.   
Consequently, we conclude that a provision for the nonprobate 
transfer-on-death of the sole member’s interest in an SMLLC should be 
included in the LLC’s organizational documents.  Obviously, as the 
SMLLC’s value and the sophistication of its owner increase, other 
transfer-on-death strategies should be pursued or implemented.  Our 
focus is on the routine SMLLC, which presently lacks a good result when 
the sole member dies. 
